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Previous “systems” of rhetoric, which have arisen as responses to felt 
needs, emphasize an individualist paradigm whereas the contempo-
rary system, responding to current impulses, tends toward a relational 
paradigm. The “Trinity” is proposed here as a trope that both prefig-
ures this relational and dialogical turn in communication studies and 
suggests the ethical ends toward which communication praxis should 
aim. In particular, the Trinitarian thought of Chiara Lubich offers a 
unique perspective on the relational current in communication studies, 
especially its links of ontology with praxis, relational being with com-
munication, and kenosis with perichoresis.
Douglas Ehninger’s groundbreaking synthesis of historic patterns in communication studies, which appeared in Philosophy and Rhetoric in 1968, recognizes common char-
acteristics of rhetorical inquiries arising out of felt needs within 
three respective eras. Ehninger calls rhetorical investigations that 
participate in a common response to needs of these given periods 
“systems of rhetoric.” Implicit in each of these “systems” is a phi-
losophy of being: for the period that Ehninger names “Classical,” 
persons are rational beings; for the “Enlightenment Period,” per-
sons are cognitive beings; and for the Modern Period, persons are 
social beings. Three loci of inquiry correspond with Ehninger’s three 
systems and attendant philosophies. For Classic rhetorical theory, 
the syllogism could locate much of rhetorical investigation. For the 
Enlightenment Period, the mind or thought could be viewed as the 
central site of exploration. And for the Modern Period, the soci-
ety takes central spot. Almost prophetically, in characterizing the 
Modern Period as “sociological” in its concern with human rela-
tions and social cohesion,1 Ehninger anticipates a fourth period 
that is the subject of this essay. 
We are now removed more than 40 years from the period at 
which Ehninger’s review stops. An updating or extension of the 
Modern Period profile into what can be called the Contemporary 
Period thus seems warranted. Modern theories that Ehninger de-
scribed in his article continue to exert influence today, yet substantial 
new theories have taken their place alongside the feted rhetorical 
ideas advanced during the middle to late part of the twentieth 
century. This essay will focus on one significant development in 
1. Douglas Ehninger, “On Systems of Rhetoric,” Philosophy and Rhetoric (1968): 131–
144.
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contemporary theory anticipated in Enhinger’s analysis: the dia-
logical current.
This extension of Ehninger’s analysis will revisit his depiction 
of the “felt need” of our times and will identify key strands of com-
munication studies2 that arise out of that exigency and work to 
remedy it. In so doing, I seek to deepen our understanding of an 
evolution in emphasis begun within the past half-century, from 
the three previous systems’ emphasis on individualist paradigms of 
discrete speakers, texts, and thought processes to a communitarian 
paradigm that stresses both the re-definition of beings as social, 
relational creatures and the interconnectedness of communica-
tors and their jointly constructed messages. In the realm of new 
media, for example, Chen and Ding find that a linear, monologic 
and technique-oriented model has given way to a relationship-
oriented and dialogic model.3 Examination of such a shift sheds 
light on the collective nature of communication inquiry as we come 
to understand how theorists respond together, even if unwittingly, 
to common impulses and as we consider the good to which new 
grasps of communication might be put. 
My aim in this analysis is to identify the ontological view that 
contemporary theories advance. To do so, I begin with a profile of 
“the felt need” out of which contemporary theory arises and pres-
ent that theory, dialogical in nature, as a response to “the felt need.” 
Next, I present “the Trinity” as a theoretical trope that prefigures 
this theory and functions as an emblem of the collective qualities 
in contemporary theory. Finally, I contemplate a relational com-
munication ethic that might derive from the Trinity trope as a 
2. Hereafter, I shall abbreviate “communication and rhetorical studies” as “communi-
cation studies.” 
3. X. Chen and G. Ding, “New Media as Relations,” Chinese Journal of Communication 
2 (2009): 367–379.
fitting response to contemporary impulses. In short, this essay sit-
uates and sketches a major current in communication studies and 
points to the ends toward which contemporary communication 
studies might work.
The “Felt Need” of Our Times and the Quest for a Solution
Rapid sociopolitical change has produced “anomie in the past sev-
eral decades.”4 The effects of anomie, as Durkheim noted, have 
been a lack of regulation (social norms) and a lack of integration 
(concern for welfare of others).5 A profound sense of separation 
from God, from one another, and from oneself permeates the 
land. With this separateness have come disillusionment and the 
experience of loss.6 The incidence of two world wars in the twenti-
eth century and persistent regional and international conflicts and 
wars in the twentieth-first century, to say nothing of terrorism, 
attest that the fabric of the human family is torn. As early as 1985, 
Bellah and his collaborators had declared that we live in a time and 
“culture of separation.”7 Today deep fractures within and among 
nations, religions, ethnic and other identity groups, political par-
ties, families, and individual selves can be seen. The rise of pluralism 
often intensifies the rift as groups pit themselves against perceived 
detractors in asserting their rights and privileges and elbow one 
another for a more prominent place at the table. As Papa and her 
4. Ruohui Zhao and Liqun Cao, “Social Change and Anomie: A Cross-National 
Study,” Social Forces 88 (2010): 1210.
5. Hayden P. Smith and Robert M. Bohm, “Beyond Anomie: Alienation and Crime,” 
Critical Criminology: An International Journal 16 (2008): 2. 
6. Robert Pippin, Modernism as a Philosophical Problem, 2nd ed. (Malden, MA: Black-
well Publishers Inc., 1999), p. 150.
7. Robert Bellah, Richard Madsen,William Sullivan, Ann Swidler, and Steven Tip-
ton, Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American Life ( New York: 
Harper and Row, 1985), p. 277.
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collaborators lament: “Fragmentation occurs when there are mul-
tiple voices and interpretations present in a cultural setting. This 
multivocality separates people from one another rather than uni-
fying them into a consensus.”8 Communication theory itself often 
eschews unifying critical schemes, warding them off as authoritar-
ian devices that oppress and silence powerless peoples, advocating, 
instead, an “uncivil tongue.”9
Communication praxis mirrors this pervasive disconnected-
ness. This is evident in the fragmentary, polemic, and often in-
flammatory forms that messages take, particularly during election 
cycles, as they fly toward us on cable television, talk radio, and web 
logs. Even the vaunted “connectivity” of our times leaves “users” at 
once wired but remote as electronic devices tend to be consumed 
privately and remain to the individual user as solitary “my-spaces,” 
leaving us, in the words by which Sherry Turkle has entitled her 
recent book, “Alone Together.”10
In the face of the decided thrust toward separation and divi-
sion, however, a countercurrent within communication studies, 
intensified in the closing decades of the twentieth century, works 
to restore human community and mutual understanding. “Our 
time is marked by a yearning for wholeness,” writes Rushing.11 
A discourse of “connection” has emerged, particularly in feminist 
8. Wendy Papa, Michael Papa, Krishna Kandath, Tracy Worrell, and Nithya Muthus-
wamy, “Dialectic of Unity and Fragmentation in Feeding the Homeless: Promoting 
Social Justice through Communication,” Atlantic Journal of Communication 13 (2005): 
250.
9. Nina Lozano-Reich, and Dana Cloud, “The Uncivil Tongue: Invitational Rhetoric 
and the Problem of Inequality,” Western Journal of Communication 73 (2009): 220–236.
10. Sherry Turkle, Alone Together: Why We Expect More from Technology and Less from 
Each Other (New York: Basic Books, 2011).
11. Janice Hocker Rushing, “E. T. as Rhetorical Transcendence,” Quarterly Journal of 
Speech 71 (1985): 188. 
and environmental rhetorics, in which we find metaphors such as 
“bridge,” “web,” and “consensus” as legitimating epistemological 
and argumentative standards.12 “Solidarity” ranks among the car-
dinal virtues as “a key virtue needed to address the problems of our 
world.”13 “There is a basic movement in the human world,” writes 
Stewart, “and it is toward relation, not division.”14 
Within the past several decades, communication studies have 
engaged in this discourse of connection by pushing vertically and 
horizontally. Along the vertical axis, Rushing, for example, looks 
to myth as a unifying scheme that works over and above the diver-
gent factors existing in culture at a given time.15 In the area of mass 
communication, Newcomb searches out the embeddedness of 
character types and plots within a “larger dialog.”16 Frank assesses 
the constructive contribution of the “new rhetoric” as “nesting dif-
ferent and incompatible values within a larger realm of rhetoric.”17 
The vertical gaze contemplates a “big tent” in which divergent 
ideas find agreement stretched-out above in a transcendent vision. 
If the vertical movement for unity or integration is transcen-
dent, the horizontal thrust is dialogical. It seeks not transcendence 
12. Mary Belenky, C. Blythe Clinchy, Nancy Goldberger, and Jill Tarule, Women’s Ways 
of Knowing: The Development of Self, Voice, and Mind (New York: Basic Books, 1986); 
Thomas Farrell, “Knowledge, Consensus, and Rhetorical Theory,” in J. L. Lucaites, 
C. M. Condit, and S. Caudill (eds.), Contemporary Rhetorical Theory: A Reader (New 
York: Guilford, 1999), p. 144.
13. David Hollenbach, The Common and Good Christian Ethics (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002), p. 50.
14. John Stewart, Bridges Not Walls: a Book about Interpersonal Communication (Boston, 
McGraw Hill, 2009), p. 9. 
15. Cf., Rushing. 
16. Horace Newcomb, “On the Dialogical Aspects of Mass Communication,” Critical 
Studies in Mass Communication 1 (1984): 42.
17. David Frank, “Argumentation Studies in the Wake of The New Rhetoric,” Argumen-
tation and Advocacy 40 (2004): 270.
53C LAR ITAS | Journal of Dialogue & Culture | Vol. 2, No. 1 (March 2013) 
but lateral “connection” as a mode of managing human affairs.18 
For example, Bakhtin, whom rhetorical theorists count among 
themselves,19 counsels not a transcendence of pluralism but an 
acknowledgment of the inherent unity-diversity dynamic in or-
dinary human action that he describes as both “centripetal” (tend-
ing toward unity) and “centrifugal” (tending toward distinction”). 
Noting the “situational nature of rhetoric,” Cherwitz and Darwin 
present a “relational” approach to meaning, positing an under-
standing of language “embodying the dynamic inter relationships 
among rhetors, auditors, and other entities in the world” and that 
“refers with” instead of “referring to.”20 Hatch explores a dialogic 
rhetoric that fosters racial atonement and reconciliation.21 
Whether moving “upward” or “sideways,” an array of contem-
porary rhetorical and communication studies participates in a 
common exploration for that which facilitates community, rela-
tionship, understanding, and communion. Thus, one can recognize 
within communication theories of the past several decades a shift 
in focus from the singular communicator privileged within Ehnin-
ger’s first three systems of rhetoric to the collaboration of commu-
nicators. Stewart makes this same point: “Humans live in worlds 
of meaning, and communication is the process of collaboratively 
constructing those meanings.”22 Recognizing the disciplinary 
18. G. T. Fairhurst, and L. Putnam, “Organizations as Discursive Constructions,” 
Communication Theory 14 (2004): 5–26.
19. John Murphy, “Mikhail Bakhtin and the Rhetorical Tradition,” Quarterly Journal 
of Speech 87 (2001): 259–277. 
20. Richard Cherwitz and Thomas Darwin, “Beyond Reductionism in Rhetorical 
Theories of Meaning,” Philosophy and Rhetoric 27 (1994): 314, italics theirs.
21. John Hatch, “Dialogic Rhetoric in Letters Across the Divide: A Dance of (Good) 
Faith toward Racial Reconciliation,” Rhetoric and Public Affairs 12 (2009): 485–532.
22. John Stewart, Bridges Not Walls: a Book about Interpersonal Communication (Boston, 
McGraw Hill, 2009), p. 18. 
coherence of these studies, however, requires a grammar for view-
ing various studies in the field as a collective unit. Later, this essay 
proposes “the Trinity” as providing such a critical grammar. 
In the phenomenological tradition, one finds a relational per-
spective in Carl Rogers’ development of “empathic listening” or 
“therapeutic listening.” Widely incorporated in interpersonal 
communication studies, Rogers’ approach asks whether two peo-
ple can get beyond surface impressions and connect on a deeper 
level . . . and describes conditions for personality and relationship 
change. Rogers’ much-acclaimed “Empathic Understanding” en-
tails temporarily laying aside one’s own views and values and en-
tering into another’s world without prejudice: an active process of 
seeking to hear the other’s thoughts, feelings, tones, and mean-
ings. Along similar lines, the Anxiety/Uncertainty Management 
(AUM) Theory of Strangers’ Intercultural Adjustment applies this 
same perspective in the intercultural realm.23 According to AUM, 
successful “sojourners,” in a process of “mindfulness,” step outside 
of themselves and their cultural systems to enter a host country 
with a goal of attaining effective intercultural communication.24 
Cissna and Anderson extract the metaphysical implications of 
such dialogic perspectives:
[D]ialogic theory presumes an elemental human truth that 
emerges only in the meeting of person with person, with the 
moments of I meeting Thou with the serendipity of reply. 
Within postmodern assumptions dialogic truth is not a 
23. William B Gudykunst, “An Anxiety/Uncertainty Management (AUM) Theory of 
Strangers’ Intercultural Adjustment,” in William B. Gudykunst (ed.), Theorizing about 
Intercultural Communication (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2005): pp. 419–458.
24. Ibid., pp. 289 ff. 
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matter of propositions but of presence, and it is available to 
be examined not propositionally, but conversationally.25
Similarly, the Theory of Coordinated Management of Mean-
ing (CMM) maintains that “persons in conversation co-construct 
their social realities and are simultaneously shaped by the worlds 
they create.”26 CMM is concerned with “what kind of identities, 
episodes, relationships, and cultures are being constructed by the 
patterns of communication put together as people interact with 
each other.”27 CMM, like Martin Buber, advocates “dialogic com-
munication” as the optimal form of communication. Buber explains 
that dialogic communication “involves remaining in the tension 
between holding our own perceptions while being profoundly 
open to the other,” a unity-in-distinction tension.28 Like Buber, 
Pearce and Pearce hold out the possibility of authentic human 
relationships through dialogue—an intentional process in which 
“the only agenda both parties have is to understand what it’s like 
to be the others.”29 The impetus for the theory was the resolution 
of “conflicts between incommensurate social worlds.”30
The area of Relational Dialectics also generally maintains that 
bonding occurs in both interdependence with and independence 
25. K. N. Cissna and R. Anderson, “Theorizing about Dialogic Moments: the Buber-
Rogers Postmodern Themes,” Communication Theory 8 (1998): 88.
26. E. Griffin, A First Look at Communication Theory, 6th ed. (Boston: McGraw Hill, 
2006), p. 69.
27. W. Barnett Pearce, “The Coordinated Management of Meaning (CMM),” in Gu-
dykunst, p. 43. 
28. W. B. Pearce and K. A. Pearce, “Combining Passions and Abilities: Toward Dialog 
and Virtuosity,” Southern Communication Journal 65 (2000), p. 172. 
29. Ibid., p. 171. 
30. Pearce, p. 45.
from the other. Baxter and Montgomery31 are principal protago-
nists of this area of study, and they draw heavily on Mikhail Bakhtin, 
who saw “dialectical tension” as the “deep structure” of all human 
experience. They believe that relationships are always in flux, and 
they see dialectical tension as providing an opportunity for dialog, 
an occasion when partners work out ways mutually to embrace the 
conflict between unity with and differentiation from each other. 
Baxter, for example, often cites Bakhtin’s core belief that two 
voices constitute the minimum for life, the minimum for existence. 
Baxter and Montgomery have focused on three overarching rela-
tional dialectics present in all relationships (Integration-separation; 
Stability-change; and Expression-nonexpression). Likewise, Kim32 
in her Culture-Based Conversational Constraints Theory, con-
ceptualizes the independent/interdependent self-construals that 
manifest in intercultural communications. She charts the cultural 
individualistic-collectivistic axes on which persons operate. People 
are “both joined and separate,” wrote Burke, “at once a distinct 
substance and consubstantial with one another.”33 In being identi-
fied with B, A is “substantially one” with a person other than him-
self or herself. Yet at the same time he or she remains unique, an 
individual locus of motives. Thus he or she is both joined and sepa-
rate, at once a distinct substance and consubstantial with another.34
While Burke states that persuasion results from a sense of one-
ness that a rhetor could create with another person, Buber has 
31. Leslie A. Baxter, and Barbara Montgomery, Relating: Dialogue and Dialectics 
(Guilford: New York, 1996).
32. M. Kim, “Culture-Based Conversational Constraints Theory,” in Gudykunst, pp. 
93–117. 
33. Kenneth Burke, A Grammar of Motives (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1969), p. 21.
34. Ibid.
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written about the essential role of “distance” in “unions.”35 He 
maintains that “distancing” or “setting at a distance” is “plain from 
the fact that one can enter into relation only with being which has 
been set at a distance, more precisely, has become an independent 
opposite.”36 Czubaroff maintains that such distance is fundamen-
tal to communication, including in communication marked by 
conflict:
Where logical unity, synthesis, and agreement are goals in 
dialectic, the dialogical meeting of persons is marked by 
“over-againstness” and, often, by “tragic conflict” which may 
arise because “each is as he is.” However, though a dialogue 
may not result in logical agreement or unanimity, it reminds 
us that real otherness “can be affirmed in opposing it.”37
For Buber, however, “the other” is not left “out there.” He views 
people as interdependent and affirms their capacity to “commune 
and to covenant” with one another.38 In fact, he extols “reciproc-
ity”: “Inscrutably involved, we live in the currents of universal 
reciprocity.”39 Buber sets out prerequisites for this communion, 
which Czubaroff delineates.40 Unity, or “becoming one,” arises out 
of these conditions. Buber explains that: 
35. Martin Buber, “Distance in Relation,” in Knowledge of Man, trans., M. Friedman 
and R. G. Smith (New York: Harper Row, 1965), p. 44.
36. Ibid., pp. 59–60.
37. J. Czubaroff, “Dialogical Rhetoric: An Application of Martin Buber’s Philosophy 
of Dialog,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 86 (2000): 170.
38. Martin Buber, “Elements of the Interhuman,” in Friedman and Smith, trans., p. 91.
39. Martin Buber, I and Thou, trans., W. Kaufmann (New York: Charles Scribners, 
1970), p. 67.
40. Czubaroff, p. 177.
When my partner in a common situation becomes thus 
alive to me, here and now for the first time does the other 
become a self for me. . . . This becoming a self for me is to be 
understood not in a psychological but in a strictly ontologi-
cal sense, and should therefore rather be called “becoming 
a self with me” . . . it is ontologically complete only when 
the other knows that he is made present by me in his self 
and when this knowledge induces the process of his inmost 
self-becoming.41 
Quigley maintains that this impulse to identify with the other 
“arises out of division; humans are born and exist as biologically 
separate beings and therefore seek to identify, through communi-
cation, in order to overcome separateness.”42
In short, Burke contemplated identification and consubstan-
tiation more than sixty years ago. Buber philosophized about 
communion and reciprocity nearly forty years ago. And Stewart 
published his earliest edition of Bridges Not Walls about that same 
time. Viewed collectively, a dialogical current began in the mid-
twentieth century and now cuts across contemporary commu-
nication studies in which communication scholars navigate the 
relational tension between “the person” and “the other.” Together 
these studies envision communicating partners in trusting rela-
tionships comprised fundamentally of the two parties’ disposi-
tion toward “making themselves one” with each other. The goal 
of interdependent self-construal, writes Kim, “is to maintain 
41. Buber, “Distance in Relation,” p. 71. 
42. Brooke Quigley, “ ‘Identification’ as a Key Term in Kenneth Burke’s Rhetorical 
Theory,”American Communication Journal 1 (1998). Retrieved on February 7, 2013, from 
http://ac-journal.org/journal/vol1/iss3/burke/quigley.html.
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connectedness and harmony with significant others.”43 But to 
grasp the relational dynamic around which a body of contempo-
rary communication studies coheres calls for a grammar for view-
ing various studies in the field as a collective unit. “The Trinity,” I 
will argue, provides that critical grammar. Moreover, I will show 
that Trinitarian thought contributes to the relational, dialogic line, 
especially as explored recently in the work of Chiara Lubich. 
The Trinity as Trope
To examine these theories with a view toward clarifying their 
collective quality and overriding motives, I adopt the “Upward 
Way” that Kenneth Burke employs in his study of language en-
titled Grammar of Motives.44 Burke’s system is a hermeneutic in 
which “a vision of the One” enlightens, in a downward move, the 
“many divergences” of the elements that fall under the vision and 
aids in “the discovery of essential motives” of those elements.45 In 
Rhetoric of Religion, Burke states that “in the study of human mo-
tives, we should begin with complex theories of transcendence 
(as in theology and metaphysics) rather than with the terminolo-
gies of simplified laboratory experiment.”46 The particular “com-
plex theory” that he uses—at once both extrinsic and analogous 
to communication studies—is Christian theology. Burke finds an 
interpretive, unifying framework, particularly in “the Trinity,” that, 
by way of analogy, brings fresh insight into his language study, or 
“logology.” Burke defends the use of a religious form to investigate 
the secular study of language, insisting that no religious belief is 
43. Kim, p. 105. 
44. Kenneth Burke, A Rhetoric of Religion: Studies in Logology (Berkley: University of 
California Press, 1961), p. 5. (Hereafter referred to as RR.)
45. Ibid., p. 430. 
46. Ibid., p. 5.
required in the process. He explains that theology adopts language 
of the material world to explain the immaterial and argues that he 
is merely reversing the process. He reasons that “statements that 
great theologians have made about the nature of ‘God’ might be 
adapted mutatis mutandis for use as purely secular observation on 
the nature of words.”47 
But Burke is interested primarily in symbols (words) not the 
broader concern of relations and communion constituted in or 
performed through communication. Burke’s principal project is 
to understand language theory by consulting religious studies of 
motives because those studies, he observes, overcome reductionist 
tendencies found in language studies. He selects the particular re-
ligious figure of the Trinity because it expresses a dialectical inter-
dependency of the word and the thing named. He seeks to explore 
the nature of language. Nevertheless, the Trinity seems useful to 
my present purpose as well in arguing for the communitarian ten-
dency of contemporary communication theory and of proposing a 
communitarian ethic of communication.
The Trinity furnishes an integrative, if at first glance abstruse, 
model for encapsulating these communitarian impulses within 
communication studies that respond to the pressing needs of our 
time. While providing an organizing scheme for a variety of theo-
ries in the field, it prefigures, on the ontological level, a contempo-
rary view of human interchange. More than this, the Trinity brings 
to light “something more” than what is contained in contempo-
rary communication studies; it helps to advance a philosophy of 
communication that poses “communion” as its principal function 
and to impart ontological status to human connection-making. It 
stands as a counterpoint to today’s tendency to obscure personal 
47. Ibid., p. 1, italics his. 
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relations in its emphasis on the collective or sociological dimen-
sion, and, instead, locates communication in the inter-human. As 
such, the Trinity serves as an apt architectonic of communication 
studies, not merely as a theological construct but as a trope that 
prefigures the dialogic current in communication studies. I thus 
apply the Trinity beyond the study of language as Burke used it, 
to consider an ideal of communication toward which communica-
tion practice might aim. Burke deciphers the framework of Trinity 
from Augustine’s reflections on his conversion in his Confessions. 
Instead, I want to broaden the conceptual contours of the Trinity 
to draw out the communitarian dimensions that I find salient in 
contemporary communication studies. 
To explore the ontological implications of the Trinity for com-
munication, I refer first to The Nicene Creed, the text that ex-
presses its contents most explicitly. It serves as a touchstone of 
Christian belief for Roman Catholic, Orthodox, and most Prot-
estant Churches and is organized around the three Persons of the 
Trinity. Each of the Persons possesses distinctive characteristics:
 • The “Father” is maker of all things; 
 • The “Son” is consubstantial to the Father;
 • The “Holy Spirit” is the Lord and giver of life.48 
Although the Persons of the Trinity are here presented as three 
distinct Persons, their distinctiveness as Persons obtains relation-
ally not substantially: The Father is Father of the Son; the Son is 
Son of the Father; the Holy Spirit is the Spirit of love between 
48. The language of “Father, Son, and Holy Spirit” is the foundation of the Christian 
tradition. Yet “Parent, Child, and Love” might capture the relational dimension that I 
want to emphasize.
Father and Son. And their relational kenotic giving themselves 
over totally to each other accords them one nature. The Persons 
exist simultaneously as distinct and one, or “triune,” sharing one 
being or substance. Downey states succinctly that “the mystery 
of God is profoundly relational, and this relational mystery is ex-
pressed in the language of Father, Son, Spirit.”49 Bakhtin recog-
nizes this same facet of Trinitarian unity and distinction in his 
theology of discourse, as Mihailovic notes: 
As people have intuited, there is much in Bakhtin’s criticism 
that does indeed lend itself to theological paradigms: his 
conceptions of dialogue and polyphony seemingly resonant 
with trinitarian unity within diversity and the notion of em-
bodied social discourse highly suggestive of an incarnational 
model.50
A philosophy of being issues from this Trinitarian construct. 
The belief in God of the Cappadocian Fathers’ in the fourth cen-
tury as a “relational unity” extended to an understanding of the 
human person, made in the image of God, as likewise a relational 
being. Thompson explains how the belief expresses a philosophy 
of human being:
[I]t gives concrete particularity to the persons who interre-
late and so constitute the deity, and at the same time it con-
ceives God’s being in these distinctions as creative of or in 
49. Michael Downey, Altogether Gift: A Trinitarian Spirituality (Maryknoll, New York: 
Orbis Books, 2000), p. 12.
50. Alexar Mihailovic, Corporeal Words: Mikhail Bakhtin’s Theology of Discourse (Evan-
ston: Northwestern University Press, 1997), p. 1.
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fact existing as communion. As a paradigm for humanity it 
sees personhood as basically relational, concrete and commu-
nitarian. In this way it has reciprocity and relationship as its 
very essence and so counters all trends to define and under-
stand personal existence in purely individualistic terms. . . . 
So central was the notion of “mutual relations” to St. Augus-
tine that he objected even to the use of “person” in describing 
the Trinity because of its suggestion of individualism.51 
To speak of relationality is to remain vague and perhaps naively 
idealistic about human communication. However, the Trinitarian 
model also offers unique resources in naming a precise sort of re-
lationality generated and sustained by the notions of kenosis and 
perichoresis. Central to this triune being is perichoresis: the notion 
of the indwelling of each of the three Persons in the other two 
Persons. This mutual indwelling is the result of kenosis, or the self-
emptying of the Father/Parent and the Son/Child in the loving 
donation one to the other.1 The action is mutual, and this circu-
lation of love through the Holy Spirit reflects a relationship of 
three Persons (hypostases) in one homousion (being or nature) and 
communion among the three Persons. Each communicates to the 
others the Person’s whole being as gift of to the other who, in turn, 
reciprocates. Each is known fully to the other because each has 
fully given and fully received the other. As Wilken notes, “gift and 
love, as used in the Scriptures, are relational terms and have built 
into them reciprocity and mutuality.”52
51. John Thompson, Modern Trinitarian Perspectives (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1994), p. 127.
52. Robert Louis Wilken, The Spirit of Early Christian Thought (Yale University Press: 
New Haven, 2003), p. 104, emphasis his.
As I said at the end of the previous section, I want to introduce 
into this conversation the Trinitarian thought of Chiara Lubich 
especially because it provides a unique perspective on this topic 
that links ontology with praxis, relational being with communi-
cation, and kenosis with perichoresis. I will argue that her mystical 
theology and spirituality make significant contributions to the cur-
rent of dialogical thought in communication studies. In his recent 
work, The Trinity: Life of God, Hope for Humanity: Towards a Theol-
ogy of Communion,53 Thomas Norris explains that fundamental to 
Lubich’s Trinitarian ontology is an integration of the categories we 
have been discussing, namely: relationality and reciprocity, kenosis 
and perichoresis, unity and communion. But he also makes it clear 
that for Lubich, one cannot speak of these realities without men-
tion of the Cross. And one cannot understand the Cross, or indeed 
the Trinity itself, without understanding love. 
For Lubich, the event of Jesus’s crucifixion and accompanying 
experience of abandonment (Matthew 27:46) is central to her Trin-
itarian understanding of kenotic love. In the abandonment, Jesus 
poses a question, “Why,” to which he does not receive an answer. 
What Lubich calls “The Cry” encompasses disrupted communica-
tion and communication breakdown, a certain ex-communication 
as well as silence.54 Only then does Jesus place his spirit into the 
hands of the Father. The vision of Trinity proposed here is thus not 
a communicative utopia: a one-to-one correspondence between 
what is intended and what is understood between two persons. 
Instead, it is the emptying and donation of self without condition 
53. Thomas J. Norris, The Trinity: Life of God, Hope for Humanity: Towards a Theology of 
Communion (Hyde Park, NY: New City Press, 2009). 
54. Chiara Lubich, The Cry: Of Jesus Crucified and Forsaken (New York: New City 
Press, 2001).
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which discloses the essential characteristic of the Trinity: Love as 
the kenotic giving of oneself as gift to the Other. 
Lubich finds in this aspect of the Cross a glimpse into commu-
nication within the Trinity itself. In Essential Writings, a collection 
of her writings and speeches, Lubich contemplates the “cry” of the 
Person of Jesus, which she describes as his fullest expression of the 
Word, the height of his communication. The “great communica-
tor,” whom Lubich names “Jesus Forsaken,” found himself alone in 
his “Cry.” Lubich infers a similar communication role in Mary, 
made “desolate” by the loss of her Son, the Word, in this Trinitar-
ian disposition. Lubich says:
The word must rest on silence, like a painting on a back-
ground. Silencing the creature in them and on this silence 
letting the Spirit of the Lord speak, professionals in commu-
nication will be more like Mary, the transparency of God.55 
The Cry instantiates the kenosis of “non-being” of Jesus in the 
moment of his abandonment. He rests his spirit on the silence of 
God who is Love, and thereby works his greatest communicative 
act of Love for humanity. Thus he is precisely in the moment in 
which he is not. Buber has addressed this phenomenon of being 
when one is not:
The non-active quality of the dialogical educator’s influ-
ence seems to be related to the fact that, as a dialogical and 
not instrumental rhetor, he is not motivated by particular 
55. Chiara Lubich, Essential Writings: Spirituality, Dialogue, Culture (New York: New 
City Press, 2007), pp. 300–301. 
needs or goals and does not have a preset particular message, 
“nothing particular, nothing partial is at work in man and 
thus nothing of him intrudes into the world. It is the whole 
human being, closed in its wholeness, at rest in its whole-
ness, that is active here, as the human being has become an 
active whole.”56
Lubich explains the kenosis of love as “non-being” in the com-
munication of one’s relational self in the economy of the Trinity in 
more metaphysical terms:
The Father generates the Son out of love, he loses himself in 
the Son, he lives in him; in a certain sense he makes himself 
“non-being” out of love, and for this very reason, he is, he is 
the Father. The Son, as echo of the Father, out of love turns 
to him, he loses himself in the Father, he lives in him, and 
in a certain sense he makes himself “non-being” out of love; 
and for this very reason, he is, he is the Son. The Holy Spirit, 
since he is the mutual love between the Father and the Son, 
their bond of unity, in a certain sense he also makes himself 
“non-being” out of love, and for this very reason, he is, he is 
the Holy Spirit.57
If we consider the Son in the Father, we must think of the 
Son as a nothingness (a nothingness of love) in order to 
think of God as One. And if we consider the Father in the 
56. Czubaroff, p. 181.
57. Lubich, Chiara, “Toward a Theology and Philosophy of Unity,” in An Introduction 
to the Abba School: Conversations from the Focolare’s Interdisciplinary Study Center (Hyde 
Park, NY: New City Press. 2002), p. 24.
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Son, we must think of the Father as a nothingness (a noth-
ingness of love) in order to think of God as One. There are 
three in the Most Holy Trinity, and yet they are One be-
cause Love is not and is at the same time. . . . [E]ach one is 
complete by not-being, indwelling fully in the others, in an 
eternal self-giving. . . . Herein lies the dynamics of life within 
the Trinity, which is revealed to us as unconditional, recipro-
cal self-giving, as mutual loving, self-emptying out of love, as 
total and eternal communion.58
In the second quotation, we can see how kenotic love can be mu-
tual, reciprocal self-giving and receiving in a way that creates com-
munion. Here we see what Norris meant when he said that all the 
categories we have been discussing in this article are integrated in 
Lubich’s thought. 
Similarly, Thompson draws on theologian Hans Urs Von 
Balthasar, who had great respect for Lubich, to explain how in the 
moment of separation, Jesus reveals his true nature and that of the 
Trinity:
There is therefore no ontological separation in God. 
Balthasar sees this as analogous to the distinction and even 
distance within God between the Father and the Son by the 
Holy Spirit—a distance which is overcome by their unity in 
love. . . . The drama of this event as a paradox of unity and 
otherness is possible only because it is based on the prior 
58. Quoted by Piero Coda in “The Experience and Understanding of the Faith in 
God-Trinity from Saint Augustine to Chiara Lubich,” New Humanity Review 15 
(2010): 38. 
drama of the triune life, where, in the relationship between 
Father and Son, there is a distance and distinction and yet 
unity by the Holy Spirit.59
The distinction-unity reality of the Son expresses Jesus’ kenosis: 
“the self-emptying of Jesus Christ first in the Incarnation and then 
on the cross, whereby he makes himself vulnerable, entering into 
the condition of human vulnerability as the icon of God’s love.”60 
The kenotic act in the process of communication opens oneself to 
the other in an act of love that makes one vulnerable but also places 
oneself in the other. If the other responds, there is communion.
Lubich highlights another key feature contained in this model 
of the Trinity. She characterizes the Trinitarian relation as conso-
nant with the understanding that God is love. Love by its nature, 
says Lubich, suggests at least two persons. It tends toward com-
pany. This calls to mind a triune God in which mutual love is the 
essence of God as Trinity. Its antithesis is single-person power that 
tends toward aloneness; one who seeks power generally seeks it for 
himself or herself. A single-Person God tends to represent sov-
ereign power without the crowning element of love. Lubich thus 
notes that “the heart of Christian anthropology” is contained in 
Jesus’ “New Commandment” to “love one another,” “with which 
it is possible to live the Trinitarian life on earth.”61 Schindler com-
ments on this ontological meaning of the Trinity and its dynamic 
of unity as a basis for human relations: “The fullness of each person 
coincides with the ‘self-emptying’ entailed in being wholly for the 
59. Thompson, p. 52.
60. Downey, p. 27.
61. Lubich, Essential Writings, p. 25. 
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other.”62 Lubich herself writes about the life of the Trinity lived in 
the midst of people:
And so I no longer love only silence, but also the word: the 
communication between God in me with God in my brother 
or sister. And if these two heavens meet, a single Trinity 
comes to be, where the two are like Father and Son and 
among them is the Holy Spirit.63
Such a view of Trinity is accessible and applicable to human af-
fairs. In Downey’s words, it is “an eminently practical teaching, 
expressing not only who and how we understand God to be, but 
what we think human persons are called to be and become . . .”64
Toward a Trinitarian Communication Ethic
We can thus add to the philosophies of being that are attached 
to Ehninger’s systems of rhetoric—humans as rational beings; hu-
mans as cognitive beings; humans as sociological beings—the phi-
losophy marking today’s scholarship that humans are relational 
beings. Whereas Burke has used the Trinity in Rhetoric of Religion 
to show how logology appropriates insights about language from 
theology, highlighting the interdependency of the word and the 
thing named, I am proposing in this essay a correspondence be-
tween the dialogical relating among the Persons of the Trinity and 
the nature of communication among human persons. By applying 
the lens of the Trinity to view communication studies collectively, 
62. David L. Schindler, “Introduction,” in An Introduction to the Abba School: Conversa-
tions from the Focolare’s Interdisciplinary Study Center, p. 8
63. Lubich, Essential Writings, p. 33.
64. Downey, p. 12.
I want to affirm within these studies the notion of our interrelated-
ness as persons in dialogue. 
The dialogical communication ethics I submit thus goes be-
yond Burke’s logology that investigates religious discourse for its 
insight into language (understood as a system of symbols) though 
John Stewart maintains that even language might better be under-
stood as “articulate contact,” dialogue, or relating. I should like to 
direct attention, instead, from language to human communication. 
Likewise, the dialogic I have in mind pushes past the “modest” 
and “minimalist” dialogical ethic of Arnett, Fritz, and Bell that 
privileges tolerance and “common ground” over unity or communion 
among disparate standpoints as a moral standard. Arnett and his 
collaborators posit a “bookstore” as an emblem of the minimalist 
ethic they advocate:
Within the physical walls of the bookstore, one encounters 
many others who adhere to competing views of the good, 
but who share an interest in reading and learning. While one 
person shops for books on Catholic perspectives on mar-
riage, another may seek a secular volume on relational health 
for gay couples. Yet another person seeks information about 
planning an estate sale.65
The good of communication in such a place would be to “find 
some commonality”—the bookstore itself—and to “learn from 
difference.” Arnett and his collaborators stress diversity and other-
ness in advancing their “minimalist” ethics. Subscribers of such a 
65. Ronald Arnett, Janie Harden Fritz, and Leanne Bell, Communication Ethics Lit-
eracy: Dialog and Difference (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2009), p. 19
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view might contend that humans are far more diverse and “other” 
(strange) than the co-eternal Persons of the Trinity. Added to their 
case might be the fact that we inhabit separate physical bodies 
with various imperfections, limitations, diseases, and deformities; 
we spring from myriad different gene pools (ethnicities); we grow 
up in radically different cultures; we live in alienated social lo-
cations; we have competing or incommensurable needs (through 
the accidents of nature and history); and so on. They might insist 
that we cannot trust our interlocutors indiscriminately and empty 
ourselves into everyone equally. At best, they might concede that 
the Trinity would seem to give us an ideal or exemplar to which to 
aspire in parent-child, or more generally, family or communities of 
faith relations. They might conclude that tolerance and a willing-
ness to learn from the “other” might serve as the only practicable 
ideals for which to aim in this world of power plays, fractious poli-
tics, and wars.66 
But Kahane asks, “[I]f justice is interpreted as the recognition 
and accommodation of differences . . . then what will hold together 
the more encompassing political community?”67 Christiansen, too, 
points to the limitations of such a dialogic of tolerance:
A dialog that is just an exchange of ideas is doomed to 
become intellectual combat [whereas a] dialog that emerges 
out of a complex web of relationships is likely over time 
66. The author acknowledges the assistance of John Hatch in suggesting the “mini-
malist/optimist” dichotomy, in anticipating objections to a Trinitarian ethic, and for 
offering other helpful comments in shaping the essay. 
67. David Kahane, “Diversity, Solidarity, and Civic Friendship,” Journal of Political 
Philosophy 7 (1999): 267.
to produce far more light than heat, more respect than 
resentment.68
In place of the “minimalist” ethic, I propose an “optimalist” ethic 
grounded precisely in relationship, which, as we have seen, has been 
highlighted in theological study, especially in recent decades. An 
optimalist ethic advocates that interlocutors affirm fellow inter-
locutors as persons, make each other fully present, and accept each 
other as partners.69 An optimalist ethic pushes further still, in the 
vein of Bakhtin, who actually speaks of “perichoresis” (interpen-
etration) as an ideal state of communication, which would stand 
in contrast with the “impenetrability” of egoism.70 Buber suggests 
the distinction between such an optimalist ethic and a minimalist 
one and envisions the potential of the former:
But where the dialog is fulfilled in its being, between part-
ners who have turned to one another in truth, who express 
themselves without reserve and are free of desire for sem-
blance, there is brought into being a memorable common 
fruitfulness which is to be found nowhere else. At such 
times, at each such time, the word arises in a substantial way 
between [persons] who have been seized in the depths and 
opened out by the dynamic of an element of togetherness. 
68. Drew Christiansen, “Staying Cool When It’s Hot: Reporting on the Christian 
Middle East,” in Dennis D. Cali, ed., Faith and the Media (New York: Paulist Press, 
2010), p. 67.
69. Buber, “Elements of Interhuman,” pp. 78–81. 
70. Jostein Børtnes, “The Polyphony of Trinity in Bakhtin.” Retrieved on September 
18, 2010, from http://www.hum.au.dk/romansk/polyfoni/Polyphonie_V/Bortnes5 
.pdf, p. 141.
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The interhuman opens out what otherwise remained 
unopened.71
I maintain that the Trinity theologically prefigures such an un-
derstanding in contemporary communication studies. It supports 
a Trinitarian communitarian ethic that offers unity and distinction; 
the person as constituted relationally; self-communication/gift; reciproc-
ity; and relationship as operative principles in fulfilling the ultimate 
function of communication: communion. The Trinity analogizes to 
the human community inasmuch as it demonstrates an ongoing, 
mutual “I-thou” relationship enacted through the communication 
of selves and the communion that follows. The Trinitarian gram-
mar proposes kenosis and perichoresis as key ingredients, the “some-
thing more” of full personhood: to be united in a mutual relation 
of love. 
Scholars have applied Trinity to human affairs in various ways, 
as Thompson has observed.72 Jacques Maritain saw in the Trinity 
a supreme representation of the essential relationality of person-
hood.73 Along similar lines, Larentzakis, in his essay entitled “The 
Social Dimension of the Trinitarian Mystery,” sees the Trinity as 
a society of persons and, as Thompson summarizes his view, an 
“archetype for the social teaching of the church.”74 He writes that 
“the person, distinguished from the individual, will be properly 
71. Buber, “Elements of Interhuman,” p. 86. 
72. Thompson, pp. 106–108.
73. Jacques Maritain, The Person and the Common Good (Notre Dame, IN: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 1966).
74. Grigorios Larentzakis, “Trinitarischer kirchnversandnis,” in Trinitat: Aktuelle per-
spektiven der theologie, ed., Wilhelm Bueuning (Freidburg: Herder, 1984), p. 178, as 
described by Thompson, p. 108.
understood only in fellowship with others.”75 Joseph Oomen stud-
ies the practical applications of the Trinity to the praxis of Chris-
tian life.76 Hollenbach recognizes the Trinity as offering guidance 
in common life and civil society.77 Similarly, Moltmann states 
that “The trinity is our social programme. . . . the exemplar of true 
human community, first in the church and also in society.”78 And 
finally, Kasper sees in the Trinity a vision of politics that transcends 
the left-wing, right-wing partisan divide:
Such a vision is as far removed from a collectivist commu-
nism as it is from an individualistic liberalism. For commu-
nion does not dominate the individual being and rights of 
the person but rather brings these to fulfillment through the 
giving away of what is the person’s own and the reception 
of what belongs to others. Communion is thus a union of 
persons and at the same time maintains the primacy of the 
always unique person. This primacy, however, finds its fulfill-
ment not in an individualistic having but in giving and thus 
granting participation in what is one’s own.79
75. Ibid.
76. Joseph Oomen, “The Concept of Trinity and Its Implication for Christian Com-
munication in India,” Bangalore Theological Forum 34 (2002): 75–82. 
77. David Hollenbach, The Common and Good Christian Ethics (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002).
78. Jürgen Moltmann, “The Reconciling Power of the Trinity in the Life of the Church 
and the World,” in The Reconciling Power of the Trinity. Conference of European Churches, 
C.E. C Occasional Paper No. 15 (Geneva: C.E.C, 1983), p. 56.
79. Walter Kasper, The God of Jesus Christ, trans., Matthew J. O’Connell (New York: 
Crossroad, 1989), p. 307.
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Again, I would like to introduce the Trinitarian thought of 
Chiara Lubich into this conversation, this time not so much in 
terms of ontology but spirituality—the praxis of faith. Based on 
her spiritual experience, Lubich writes: “I felt that I was created 
as a gift for the person next to me, and the person next to me was 
created by God as a gift for me as the Father in the Trinity is ev-
erything for the Son, and the Son is everything for the Father.”80 
This vision of the human person as gift grounded Lubich’s desire 
to live out what she has understood: “The life we must try to imi-
tate is the life of the Holy Trinity, by loving each other, with the 
grace of God, in the way the persons of the Holy Trinity love one 
another. . . . the mysticism of a unity of souls who are a reflection, 
here on earth, of the Trinity above. . . .”81
For Lubich, this is possible since humanity as a whole has been 
created in the image of God—of the Trinity. It is not that just 
each individual person is created in the image of God, but the hu-
mankind is created as a collective image of the Trinity. The goal of 
Lubich’s spirituality of unity is to realize this shared nature of our 
relational personhood in daily life. However, she also recognizes 
the objections I raised earlier, namely the limitations of our fini-
tude. But she affirms that the Trinitarian life can be lived to a de-
gree because the divine life of God is within each person: “Human 
beings are finite and cannot penetrate each other, but God can 
penetrate each.”82 In the following, Lubich speaks about this using 
the word “heaven” for this inner presence of God: 
80. Judith M. Povilus, United in His Name: Jesus in Our Midst in the Experience and 
Thought of Chiara Lubich (New York: New City Press, 1992), p. 67. 
81. Ibid., p. 66.
82. Ibid., p. 64. 
I will love then, not silence, but the word . . . that is, the 
communication between God in me and God in my neigh-
bor. And if the two heavens meet, there rests a single Trinity 
where the two are like Father and Son and among them is 
the Holy Spirit. We must recollect ourselves also in the pres-
ence of our neighbor, not by escaping our neighbors—but 
rather by recollecting them into our heaven and recollecting 
ourselves into their heaven.83 
I believe that Lubich’s spirituality of living the Trinitarian life 
poses a model and a grammar of communication that synthesizes, 
on one level, major strands of current communication studies, 
and, on another level, the communication act itself: both the “way 
things are” and the “way things might be” in the communication 
process. One can see reflections of the Trinity within the coordi-
nates of the conventional model of the communication process. 
But the Trinity proposes “something more.” It is distinguished 
from a “minimalist” perspective in that it advances a gymnastic 
of a giving and receiving—“addressivity” and “receptivity”—of 
love and the creation of communion as the ideal of communica-
tion. In a Trinitarian ethic lived by persons following the model 
of Lubich, each person is engaged in mutual gifting, simultane-
ously and actively “giving to” and “taking in” the other. Each exists 
in a situation encompassing them both, and something is gener-
ated out of this union, a message, Logos. Even in Burke’s system, 
“. . . the word for perfect communion between persons is ‘Love.’ ”84 
Thus, the element of love must be added to the communication 
83. Ibid., p. 65.
84. R R, p. 30. 
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act and to communication studies to engage them more purely in 
Trinitarian grammar. Person 1—Message—Person 2—Feedback 
and Feedforward—Environment can be viewed as coordinates of 
the Trinitarian dynamic when the two (or more) persons engage in 
mutual kenosis and, in turn, perichoresis, or mutual indwelling as far 
as possible for finite human beings. The Trinity can thus be viewed 
as Icon of communication and for communication studies. 
Reporter and communication scholar Michele Zanzucchi 
provides an example of the Trinitarian perspective at work in a 
newsroom:
We have the practice of submitting articles to at least two 
other editors so that what we write truly reflects a sharing 
of ideas and perspectives. We also work hard to ensure full 
communication and input between the editorial staff and 
those who work on graphic design and layout, so that there 
is a unity between what we say and how it appears in the 
magazine. As with any staff, we have different opinions and 
ideas—so it’s often a real exercise to “empty” ourselves so as 
to fully understand and appreciate what the other is try-
ing to communicate. But in this atmosphere of giving and 
receiving, of mutual love, we are usually able to achieve the 
unanimous consent before the magazine is published.85
85. Cali, p. 24. Other scholars have applied this Trinitarian model to their own fields, 
mainly in Europe where Chiara Lubich is better known: Antonio Maria Baggio (poli-
tics), Brendan Leahy (theology) Bernhard Callebaut (sociology), Pasquale Ferrara (in-
ternational relations), Donald W. Mitchell (interreligious dialogue), Brendan Purcell 
(philosophy), and Luigino Bruni (economics). 
I have observed such an ethic in my own communications with 
administrators and colleagues. I remember, for example, feeling 
some anxiety in anticipation that what I would be disclosing to 
a dean might provoke adverse reactions, but then feeling peace 
when she seemed more motivated to understand what I was saying 
than to judge it. She listened to me express concerns in an “active” 
silent way and entered the heart of what I sought to convey, and, 
in turn, offered her own “voice” on these matters. I have sought 
to maintain such a communication disposition with colleagues as 
well and ordinarily with productive results. It is an Every Person’s 
ethic, applicable in both grand and vastly broadcast communica-
tions and in the more prosaic communications of responding to a 
student’s untutored question, answering the phone, or responding 
to an e-mail. Such an ethic might be reckoned a “virtue ethic” in 
that it does not prescribe what to do in particular situations that 
pose particular moral dilemmas. Instead, it offers an orientation, 
an outlook, for viewing fellow interlocutors as persons to whom 
one would give oneself and from whom one would in turn receive. 
Indeed, within the constraints of fast-paced communication of 
today—“a hurried email, followed by a text message, a brief phone 
call made between a sandwich and an appointment”—a spirit of 
fellowship may be often the only “tool” available to communica-
tors to preserve an “awareness that at the other end of the message 
is not an object but a person, a person to be loved, and who can 
also love in return.”86
86. Ibid., p. 31.
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Final Reflections
The current dialogical wave in communication studies gives promi-
nence to “the other.” Within that focus, some attend to “difference” 
and suggest means by which understanding and tolerance might 
be achieved. Others underscore “the person” and suggest means 
by which “harmony” might be achieved through communication 
between persons. While the communication studies reviewed here 
do not convey the fullness of the Trinitarian grammars of kenosis 
and periochoresis, they nonetheless strain toward communion. Thus 
the Trinity stands both as an emblem of these contemporary stud-
ies and a paradigm of that to which they aspire.
My analysis demonstrates that the Trinity serves as a useful 
capsule of significant impulses in contemporary communication 
studies. It synthesizes those studies but with its grammar of kenosis 
and perichoresis also goes beyond them. The Trinitarian perspective 
advanced in the dialogical current of contemporary communica-
tion thought, then, has practical application to the field of com-
munication. First, it stresses that the person matters most, not the 
medium through which the communication occurs nor even the 
message itself. “The Trinity” emblematizes that the person, real-
ized relationally, is something more than a theoretical “other” but 
is instead the one with whom “I” am intimately bound. Secondly, 
the goal of communion necessarily admits of distinction, as with 
the three Persons of the Trinity, who, though one, are, at the same 
time, distinct as Persons—Unity and Distinction. Central to the 
Trinitarian view of communication is a third notion of reciprocity: 
the action is not uni-directional or serial but a coming-and-going. 
Communion is achieved not through the communicator’s singu-
lar act of scoping out the needs and expectations of one’s fellow 
interlocutor, but through a mutual giving between self and other. 
The Trinity thus proposes that to communicate, interlocutors must 
“make themselves one,” which entails a certain vacating of self, 
kenosis, and a simultaneous fulfillment of self-in-relation, or peri-
choresis: I in the other person, the other person in me. The Trinity, 
thus encompassing a major strand of contemporary communica-
tion, performs two functions. One, it highlights the essentially re-
lational character of persons; and two, it names that relationality 
in specific ways: love in the form of kenosis and perichoresis. This, 
then, is the “something more” of mutual love that the Trinitarian 
position proposes that accords its unique value as a unifying ethic. 
All of this brings to light dimensions of communication stud-
ies—including interpersonal, mass, and rhetorical—that stretch 
kenotically toward “the other,” toward “reciprocity” and “commu-
nion,” and toward a reality that is generated among two people 
engaged in authentic communication and who thus overcome 
mis-communication. The spiritual and theological reflections of 
Downey, Lubich, Thompson, and others and the Trinitarian stud-
ies in other disciplines help bring into relief elements embedded 
within major contemporary theories in the field of communica-
tion studies. It is my contention that Chiara Lubich best captures 
the contemporary and emerging paradigm: the essence of person-
hood, as expressed in the Trinity, is being for one another while 
being in unity with one another. For her, the person is not defined 
essentially by substance but by the relationship of giving and re-
ceiving where each is gift for the other. The dialogical current in 
communication studies can collaborate with Lubich’s Trinitarian 
thought and praxis in articulating what persons are, a “here-and-
now reality,” and what they can become, a “reality-yet-to-come.”87 
87. Schindler, p. 12.
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Together they can explore the Trinity as a paradigm for commu-
nication studies. 
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